Despite their valuation and the hype, these new business ecosystems are frail. This is not only 18 because the underlying technology is rapidly evolving, but also because competitive markets see a
Introduction

26
We live in a fascinating time in human history. Humanity is rapidly approaching a "Singularity"
27
as Ray Kurzweil put it in his book "The Singularity is Near" (Ray Kurzweil 2005) , referencing the point 28 in human history when artificial intelligence agents will be more intelligent than the entire human race.
the DAO commons, sets the exchange rules for the EC and PC Tokens within the commons and externally to other ecosystem tokens and fiat, sets the 172 ownership/membership and sharing rules for the DAO commons, defines and 173 enforces reputation also in relation to non-DAO reputation measurement and 174 management models, sets collaboration and giving rules with internal and external entities, and acts as the interface to not-for-benefit entities etc.
177
This three-zone model is designed to
178
• Insulate the economically vulnerable FBC and PC from extractive external markets 179 through the EC commons by limiting token exchanges between the common markets 180 that have direct interfaces to competitive markets.
181
• Enable social impact results through the FBC without a strong dependency on 182 market results given that the FBC which decides about use of funds coming from the 183 EC, is independent of "shareholder value" as defined by external, extractive markets 184 but is rather accountable to the PC and EC participants 2 The Digital Library of the Commons defines "commons" as "a general term for shared resources in which each stakeholder has an equal interest" ("Digital Library Of The Commons" n.d.)
• Allows the EC to focus on raising funds for both the FBC and PC either through selling of products and services or raising of funds for future products and services
187
and social impact efforts shareholder who dictates the expectation of the business's outcomes in exchange for the risk they 
198
Framework for Market Comparison
199
To compare the two markets resulting from decentralized socioeconomic and competitive
200
models, we will use a simple framework of market characteristics:
201
• Number and size of producing organizations with respect to the market size
202
• Barriers to entry of new firms, informed by the ratio of fixed to total cost and network
effects
204
• Product differentiation and degree of information symmetry 4
205
Decentralized Socioeconomic Markets
206
The organizational structure for a model that creates a decentralized socioeconomic market has 
211
Number and size of producing organizations with respect to the market size:
212
• In decentralized markets, there are a large number of producing organizations as the 
256
• Because assets are open and transparent from blockchain-mediation, information 257 symmetry is approached, but not reached due to bounded rationality. 6 258 5 More explicitly, (the number of producing organizations (project teams)/ market opportunity) in decentralized market is greater than (the number of producing organizations (firms)/ market opportunity) in a competitive market by virtue of project teams having fewer people than firms because there's no bureaucracy. This is a theory based on logic, not observation. 6 Bounded rationality means actors make imperfect decisions because of lack of understanding, time, or access to information
• The number of firms is large. This develops competitiveness as each firm works to 264 develop a preferred offering
265
Barriers to entry of new firms
266
• Competitive markets are characterized by easy entry into and exit from the market.
267
Without this being the case, the market would become a monopoly.
268
Product differentiation and degree of information symmetry
269
• Products are differentiated, and information asymmetry is a factor that can drive 
306
Another implication of diverse value definitions in decentralized socioeconomic models is the 307 ability to accrue value to the members as reputation tokens. These tokens are generated by giving 308 transactions 10 in the market, and are a key incentive structure for innovation that is not 10 A reputation token represents the appreciation of any justified and finalized giving action without any economic compensation through ecosystem tokens or other ecosystem external assets e.g. you cannot build a barn and get paid in bread and expect to gain social reputation (Andreas Freund 2018).
11 Non-exchangeable value refers to efforts that benefit humankind, but do not produce a product or service that a single person would rationally buy. One example is reducing your personal carbon footprint.
existing markets, also referred to as transvestment because value is transferred horizontally between 346 economic paradigms. The other component that interfaces between decentralized and competitive 347 markets need is an accounting system that tracks value within the decentralized socioeconomic 348 market. The case studies below will explore three different market interface models that have been 349 developed and used by existent decentralized socioeconomic models.
350
Case Studies in how Decentralized Economies interact with Competitive Markets
351
We will employ the following Case Study Format:
352
• Introduce the economy's purpose.
353
• Define value flow at the edge aka market interactions, and accounting within the 354 system.
355
• Note any important outcomes.
356
12 Global markets refers to both decentralized and competitive markets 13 Value sovereignty is "the capacity to self-regulate its relations with the market and to assure that significant aspects of its common wealth and social relationships remain inalienable -not for sale via market exchange." Put another way, "...a commons must be able to develop "semi-permeable boundaries" that enable it to safely interact with markets on its own terms. For example, a coastal fishery functioning as a commons may sell some of its fish to markets, but the goals of earning money and maximizing profit cannot be allowed to become so foundational that it crowds out commons governance and respect for ecological limits." ("Peer Production License -P2P Foundation" n.d. 
448
People who contribute to entrepreneurial projects, and who contributed to 449 the production of the assets held in common that were used, are 450 compensated in a commons-measure of value. This is the internal value 451 regime, independent of the existing competitive market. Because these
452
"ethical companies" will be opening their IP, they will be less attractive to 
478
Furthermore, the motivation of large financial institutions to be involved in asset exchanges is 
550
Given that platforms such as Ethereum have both protocol and application layers which are 551 economically relevant, we will refer to both application and protocol layers within the proposals 552 where required.
553
Proposal 1: Collusion Resistant and Tamper Proof Consensus Governance
554
To achieve high-levels of decentralization and operability, economies and business models 
594
The ability to adjust rewards and fee schedules after launch is an important requirement for an 595 ecosystem to set its own fiscal and monetary policy by either enhancing or reducing incentives and 596 token production rate.
597
Proposal 2: Programmatic Value Recourse: Equitable Asset Participation
598
Because it forms the socioeconomic backbone of a DAO, each commons requires a decentralized 599 accounting system. In such an accounting system participants know that their contributions are 600 recognized and valued fairly. This establishes and maintains trust, transparency and strong 601 reciprocity between DAO participants. This also applies to asset usage between DAOs because strong 602 reciprocity creates efficient usage of existing assets and lets participants focus on adding value rather 603 than recreating already existing value. It also encourages asset creators to share and combine assets 604
14 Proof-of-Stake = An Algorithm that requires participants to provide an economically meaningful stake of some type that allows them to participate as a network validator in a consensus protocol and earn money through rewards. The economic stake can be lost if a validator violates specific rules of a consensus protocol. Therefore, the economic stake acts as a deterrent to malicious validator behavior how. Hence, the more people that have the know-how, the less the risk there is of a key person leaving 
637
To scale an OVA framework, we need to scale trust and, therefore, transparency and consensus.
638
We propose to leverage existing components of a protocol layer, any employed digital identity 639 protocol(s) of an ecosystem and secure consensus algorithms.
640
Each project in the DAO needs to define its own meaning of value. Then a process to assess the 641 value of a contribution to an asset or deliverable needs to be defined. This can be unique to each 642 project. Ideally, the DAO defines in its FBC guidelines how value is to be assessed (timeliness,
643
resources expanded, deliverables met, quality requirements met, cost requirements met etc.). We will 644 now show that even if every project has its own way to assess value, there will not be a strong 645 dependence of on the way another project assesses value:
646
Once the definition of value has been settled, we recommend the following process to translate 
650
Value can be assessed in any combination of tokens. If reputation tokens are chosen, the contribution 651 has to be treated as a giving transaction 15 and its evaluation should follow the process described in 
811
To avoid the destabilizing scenarios of centralized exchanges, we suggest a decentralized 812 exchange facility as a programmatic ecosystem utility service.
813
• where there are no information and trading capability asymmetries due to full 
840
Coming back to gold as a currency reserve asset, in times other than that of rapid change as 841 described above the tie to gold provided significant currency stability. Since decentralized economies,
842
especially emerging ones, do not have financial trust in the traditional sense, they should not be 843 subject to "fuzzy", non-objective value measures based on the opinion of a few financial experts such 844 as rating agencies, but rather employ transparent asset accounting systems that are censorship 845 resistant and tamper proof as we discussed above with the OVA framework. Therefore, we should 846 be looking for ways to combine the best of both worlds, the stability that tying a currency to a highly valued asset class provides, while at the same time having flexibility in the reserve asset class itself models like Backfeed, Colony.io, district0x and Peerism.
874
As decentralized socioeconomic models begin to develop, they must survive within the existing 
897
redistributed to all contributors based on their agreement of the value each contributor should earn.
